

Strategy Research Project

Coordinating the United States Interagency Partnering Effort

by

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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Abstract

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International Partnering efforts have become the primary way for the United States to deal with an increasingly unstable and volatile global environment. Interest in partnering efforts by the Department of Defense, Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development have accelerated as a means of avoiding conflict and addressing post conflict resolution. Unfortunately, compartmentalization among the aforementioned agencies has led to redundancies of programs and processes with no method for consistently leveraging the partnering abilities of other agencies. While there are successes at interagency partnering, there is no unifying doctrine, documentation, or historical repository for partnering efforts, so institutionalizing interaction at the interagency and international level is difficult. Creating an Office of International Partnership will coordinate and create a common language of partnering while applying the best historically successful efforts to the current operating environment.

Coordinating the United States Interagency Partnering Effort

“Men and women who know the brutal reality of war, who know that war strips people of their very humanity, must unite in a new global partnership for peace.”

-Daisaku Ikeda

International Partnering efforts have become the primary way for the United States to deal with an increasingly unstable and volatile global environment. Successful strides have been made in the partnership arena from international, interagency joint coalitions like in Haiti to joint multinational military exercises like Cobra Gold. The *National Security Strategy 2010* says that the United States must have “a deliberate and inclusive interagency process, so that we achieve integration of our efforts to implement and monitor operations, policies, and strategies”.¹

There are many different names for partnering, but they all have a consistency throughout that requires a cohesive and cooperative plan that can pull together the capabilities that exist throughout the whole of government without duplicating effort. In the last 6 years², interest in partnering efforts by the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (DoS), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) have accelerated as a means of avoiding conflict and addressing post conflict resolution. These agencies address the common interests that we share with our partners and allies when conducting partnership activities. The above list is not all-inclusive of the agencies of the United States Government; however they are the lead agencies for national security and foreign policy and are often the conduit through which other government agencies interact at the international level. It is on these lead agencies that this paper will focus.

The United States Grand Strategy, defined by Paul Miller as “building democratic peace, defending the American homeland, maintaining a favorable balance of power, punishing rogue actors, and investing in good governance/allied capabilities abroad”³, is increasingly implemented through dialogue and interaction across the interagency and to the international community. United States Government Agencies, whether tied to diplomacy, defense, or development are each building capabilities in partnership that take advantage of each agency’s unique knowledge and skills.

Compartmentalization leads to a redundancy of programs and processes with no method for consistently leveraging the partnering abilities of other agencies. Currently there is no national plan to address this as identified by the *National Security Strategy 2010*:

...work remains to foster coordination across departments and agencies. Key steps include more effectively ensuring alignment of resources with our national security strategy, adapting the education and training of national security professionals to equip them to meet modern challenges, reviewing authorities and mechanisms to implement and coordinate assistance programs, and other policies and programs that strengthen coordination.⁴

This remaining work must also include solidifying interaction at the interagency and international level in a way that will avoid processes being derailed by a lack of consensus, resources or leadership. There is no unifying doctrine, documentation, or historical repository for partnering efforts, whether we are building nations or building wells in the Sahara. As recently as 2010, the *United States Navy’s Strategy for the 21st Century* identified that “interagency and multinational coordination lacks a formal process framework and supporting architecture. Naval forces must therefore be

capable of collaboratively planning, preparing, executing, and assessing operations through innovative application...”⁵ This lack of direction is what causes the interagency to re-invent partnering capabilities with each effort while the skills developed in one circumstance are not transferred to the next.

International partnering efforts touch every aspect of national power and yet there is no formalized leveraging of the current skills and capabilities throughout the government and across the environment. Without a concrete means of coordinating at the interagency level, efforts that are undefined will not be quantifiable, hence not repeatable. This paper will explore how the DoD, DoS and USAID conduct partnering activities, historical trends in partnering and a solution for the future that can combine agency successes for the benefit of all.

The current partnership environment provides a wealth of United States Government Interagency examples, however, the plan is to provide, not an exhaustive list, but rather to highlight areas where strategic level partnership efforts are successful and/or where they are too narrowly focused. The challenges of unity of effort are not insurmountable: post 9/11 US civil authorities have improved their interaction across state and federal agencies, and internationally, NATO is partnering with 28 member nations for everything from humanitarian assistance to post conflict resolution. While neither of the aforementioned has been easy, they are successful.

The DoD has a structure of partnership that is extensive, and rightly so as members of the military find themselves increasingly involved across all of the national elements of power: diplomatic, informational, military and economic (DIME). Examples

of this can be found in the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) and the United States Army National Guard (ANG).

Quoting from the 2006 DoD *Quadrennial Defense Review*, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta observed that the “Quadrennial Defense Review recognized the critical importance of having the authorities and resources to perform what it called ‘building partnership capacity’.”⁶ He further discussed how much these efforts have increased in importance to the defense of our country and that they are no longer on the periphery of defense, but have now become center stage over the last 6 years.⁷ The DoD is on the cutting edge of partnering and there have been valuable lessons learned at the tactical and operational levels during the last 11 years of war. These lessons in partner and nation building cross all elements of national power and cannot afford to be lost. This is reinforced in the *National Defense Strategy 2008*:

Our efforts require a unified approach to both planning and implementing policy... military success alone is insufficient to achieve victory. We must not forget our hard-learned lessons or allow the important soft power capabilities developed because of them to atrophy or even disappear. Beyond security, essential ingredients of long-term success include economic development, institution building, and the rule of law, as well as promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to the people, training and equipping indigenous military and police forces, strategic communications...The Department of Defense has taken on many of these burdens. Our forces have stepped up to the task of long-term reconstruction, development and governance. The U.S. Armed Forces will need to institutionalize and retain these capabilities.⁸

This is further illuminated in Dr. Boone Bartholomees article on Land power, as he believes that in the current unpredictable terrain it is doubtful that the military will be

confined to strictly military operations.⁹ He points out that the Defense Science Board identified that “Stabilization and reconstruction [S&R] operations are not a lesser included task of a combat mission, but a separate and distinct mission with unique requirements for equipping and training. Thus, S&R requirements should be a major driver for the future force.”¹⁰

The DoD has a robust partnering capability in DSCA. Their mission is to “Lead, resource, and educate the Defense Security Cooperation community to shape, refine, and execute innovative security solutions for partners in support of U.S. interests”.¹¹ Their core competencies: foreign military sales and training, resource management for diverse national and international funds and programs, engagement with international customers, education and training for U.S. government, industry, and international partners,¹² etc. are partnership focused. This gives agency personnel a well-rounded understanding of how to interact within the interagency as well as on an international level.

DSCA maintains a military focus and while there are individuals from other agencies attached to DSCA, their mission is security driven and does not include economic development, nor diplomacy...at least not on a formal level. In DSCA, personnel may learn the skills to function at all levels diplomacy and development, however, they are not the primary interest of the agency.

The concept of a Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) was created post World War II to provide joint inter-service regional continuity and to negate future global hegemonic aspirations. The roles of the GCC have become broader in scope than what

perhaps was originally intended. Col Timothy Brown defines the modern GCCs in terms that are more flexible than in the past and indicative of the continuously changing and volatile global environment:

Geographic Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) are the senior Department of Defense representatives in their respective areas of responsibility (AORs). CCDRs receive strategic direction from the President and Secretary of Defense through a variety of formal and informal methods (to be covered in TSC-04) and are responsible for planning and executing operations to achieve US strategic ends. To effectively shape his AOR, a CCDR must accurately understand his environment and problems he faces or will face, then fashion an adaptable strategy that meets current challenges while preparing for future – and yet unknown – threats, challenges, and opportunities. This strategy must be flexible enough to prevent threats and challenges from arising when possible, defeat threats when necessary, and take advantage of opportunities that might be “hidden” within the larger dynamic strategic environment.¹³

GCCs, more than any time in the past, are required to interact in their region across all elements of national power. As in all DoD agencies, the GCC’s priority focus is security, but this stolid definition becomes more difficult when the economic and humanitarian well-being of a country are direct coefficients for developing Theater Security Cooperation plans.

While typically successful in their interagency endeavors, the GCC’s don’t always use resources designated for interagency cooperation in the same way. The creation of the Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG) illuminates this issue. The JIACGs were created to provide “a full-time, multifunctional advisory element of the combatant commander’s staff that facilitates information sharing throughout the interagency community.”¹⁴ In her article “Where are the JIACGs today?” Jan Schwarzenberg details how each GCC follows a different path for the JIACGs from using them as a robust

capability to virtual non-existence, depending on the approach of the individual combatant commanders.¹⁵ By letting each GCC develop its own interagency resource, capabilities can end up being event or personality driven vice doctrinally driven.

While the GCCs interaction with the JIACGs is not uniformly successful, partnering with the United States Army National Guard's (ANG) State Partnership Program is. The program has provided an opportunity for the GCC's to have a culturally trained and knowledgeable military country partner available to interact in areas deemed most important within the respective regions.

The ANG's state partnership program was designed to partner each state with a nation of interest. These partner activities are "coordinated through the Combatant Commanders, U.S. Ambassadors' country teams, and other agencies as appropriate to ensure National Guard cooperation is tailored to meet U.S. and international partners' objectives".¹⁶ The ANG believes that the value in these partnerships lies in the "Ability to focus a part of the Department of Defense—a state's National Guard—with a single country or region in support of U.S. and partner country objectives".¹⁷ With 65 partnerships spanning over 20 years, the National Guard's vision has been put into action successfully across the globe.

The ANG's partnership pays dividends not only at the strategic level, but also at the operational/tactical levels. Army Staff Sgt. Jim Greenhill, in a 2010 article, reported:

When the Central European nation of Hungary –which, after 17 years partnered with the Ohio National Guard...chose to deploy on a NATO mission to Afghanistan, leaders had a request: Deploy us with our Ohio National Guard partners. For almost two years, Hungarian-led Operational Mentor and Liaison

Teams have rotated through Afghanistan, and each unit has been 50 percent Hungarian, 50 percent Ohioan.¹⁸

Truly an example for international and interagency cooperation, the National Guard fused their unique capabilities with interagency strategic requirements to build a concrete method for global success.

The DoS is the primary agency for diplomacy, but they become involved in other national elements of power such as economic and informational. “As the lead U.S. foreign affairs agency, the U.S. DoS has over 265 diplomatic locations around the world, including embassies, consulates, and missions to international organizations”.¹⁹ While they find themselves working with the DoD quite frequently, their role is never military in nature.

The principle means the DoS uses to project the national interests of the United States is the diplomatic missions of the embassies throughout the world. Each embassy or mission has a country team that includes the ambassador and foreign service personnel. They work in partnership with the DoD through the Defense Attaché. This relationship was enhanced for better unity of effort with the 2007 DoD Directive (DoDD) 5105.75 which changed the leadership of the Security Cooperation/Defense Attaché Office to fulfill not only the duties traditionally associated with a Defense Attaché, but also those of security cooperation and defense representation. The Security Cooperation/Defense Attaché Office is the Chief of Mission’s principal military advisor on defense and national security issues.²⁰

The change to the working relationship between the DoD and DoS illuminates efforts made by the DoS to expand interagency cooperation. Additional interagency improvements were identified through the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review 2010 (QDDR) and plans put in place through the improved 2011 Integrated Country Strategy.

United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made a groundbreaking effort to address partnering deficiencies in the first QDDR 2010. The purpose is to enable the DoS to improve their ability to “defuse crises before they explode, and enabling diplomats to be ‘the partner that our military needs if violence does break out’.”²¹ Secretary Clinton called the review “a blueprint for how our country can lead in a changing world through what I call civilian power.”²²

A holistic approach to preventing conflict before it happens and enabling economic development is legally and ethically defined in the QDDR. Areas of improvement for DoS and USAID are identified and recommendations made on how to implement improvements. Unfortunately, a theoretical approach does not break down real divisions in the interagency as noted by Renanah Miles in National Defense University’s *Prism*:

The mandate of the U.S. Department of State (DOS) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to lead U.S. stabilization and reconstruction efforts is marked by an inability to field a viable civilian response capable of managing in the absence of the military leadership or of leading an integrated civil-military team. The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) outlines reforms to close this capacity gap. Even if implemented, QDDR reforms are unlikely to be sufficient to address the root problems of bureaucratic rivalries and strained resources...DOS and USAID must take calculated steps to address the underlying bureaucratic, corporate cultural, and structural

considerations by clarifying roles and responsibilities, clearly defining the mandate, articulating a strategic framework for developing and applying capacity, and demonstrating that capacity...Building a robust DOS and USAID capacity for stabilization and reconstruction ultimately will enhance both efficiency and effectiveness, as the skills required largely reside in the civilian arms of foreign affairs²³

The agency cultural clashes that occur between the DoS and USAID are similar in nature to the inter-service rivalry that occurs in the DoD. Improving interagency fusion and interaction cannot occur unless rivalries are put aside and the common mission becomes paramount to all.

Based on guidance from the QDDR, in 2011 the DoS developed a new Integrated Country Strategy. The new strategy takes into account all previous efforts at the mission level and combines it with new ways to plan for future diplomatic and development requirements. This combined planning with DoS and USAID creates one “strategy that encapsulates U.S. government policy priorities, objectives, and the means by which diplomatic engagement, foreign assistance, and other tools will be used to achieve them.”²⁴

The Integrated Country Strategy is a plan to develop a single strategy that the QDDR defines as comprised of “two main components—a diplomatic strategy and foreign assistance strategy”.²⁵ This is a sensible plan, as is the goal to update each mission vision and strategy every three years, however, DoD is included only on the periphery as part of conflict resolution: “Particularly in countries characterized by conflict or instability...civilian and military teams develop innovative mechanisms for civil-military collaboration, such as shared funding or pooled funds.”²⁶ Using the

concept of “shared funding” as the example for civil-military collaboration negates the skills that the military has developed in the last 11 years of conflict and the Integrated Country Strategy lacks a whole agency approach in the development of interagency partnership....it is a whole of civilian agency approach.

Included in the aforementioned civilian approach is USAID. The product of merged international aid agencies in 1961, USAID is the world’s preeminent agency for global development. Integrated in 2006 with the DoS, USAID still has its own unique role in United States foreign policy and is the “independent federal agency that manages U.S. foreign economic and humanitarian assistance programs around the world.”²⁷

USAID has missions in over 100 countries many of which are developing nations. This creates a close partnership with the DoD because many developing locations are in unsecure areas. The developmental efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan place members of USAID squarely on the front lines with members of the US Military and they join together to find ways around bureaucracy to put the mission first. CDR Eric Burks, a Provincial Reconstruction Team Commander in 2006, explained that he and his partner would get together daily and talk about projects they needed to accomplish for their province. If they could use DoD money on the project they did, but if of DoD funds were unauthorized, they used USAID money. The key was that the mission came first.²⁸ The provincial reconstruction team effort, in this case, provides an example of USAID’s willingness to have other agencies work with them on what has nominally been their mission alone.

DoD, DoS and USAID, in spite of success at the micro level to achieve unity of effort, generally have differing agency baseline missions. Nathan Finney's 2010 article for the *Small Wars Journal* points out that in the past,

Broadly speaking, the Pentagon views fragile and post-conflict states primarily through the national security prism, as part of a larger counterterrorist and counterinsurgency agenda, with a particular focus on the Muslim world; the State Department is preoccupied with transforming a wider range of weak and war-torn states into effective democracies; and USAID regards state weakness as a developmental challenge to be addressed by working with local actors to create the institutional foundations of good governance and economic growth.²⁹

Attempts to coordinate these differing missions allows for a myriad of interagency work at the operational and tactical levels. DoD, DSCA and the GCCs are increasingly developing their own inter-defense partnership through efforts like the DSCA Campaign Support Plan (CSP). The CSP, developed in 2010, is intended to "support CCDRs in achieving their campaign plan objectives through flexible and responsive assistance that ranges from providing technical advice and expertise during campaign plan development to innovative security cooperation solutions to urgent requirements throughout campaign plan execution".³⁰

Teaming efforts by DoS and USAID in diplomacy and development are mirrored in USAID and DoD partnering efforts. The Army National Training Center started employing former USAID personnel with Provincial Reconstruction Team experience to assist in their 6-month training course for Provincial Reconstruction Team commanders.³¹ In 2009, USAID also "began offering a three-day USAID familiarization course for military personnel and the Foreign Service Institute offered several reconstruction and stabilization training courses for civilians and military."³²

Occasionally there have been areas where each agency mission has been part of the larger whole, especially in the last 11 years. These occasions lead the agencies to attempt development of partnership plans at the strategic level. The Diplomacy, Development and Defense (3D) concept is an example of an attempt to harness all the lessons learned in interagency cooperation and formalize them in planning guidance. The guidance formalizes processes that have been developed in recent years.

3D is considered to be a “whole of government” approach to interacting on the global stage. “3D are the three pillars that provide the foundation for promoting and protecting U.S. national security interests abroad.”³³ DoD, DoS and USAID chartered a 3D planning group (3DPG) in 2011 to provide more unity of effort in planning and coordinating across the interagency and to educate “stakeholders on 3D planning, promoting dialogue among 3D planners, and improving the quality of planning processes among the 3Ds to create the conditions for collaborative 3D planning.”³⁴ 3DPG created an interagency planning guide to aid in conducting business across all three areas of interest.

The 3D concept and the 3D Planning Guide cover the wide areas of interest of DoD, DoS and USAID, however, it does not give a concrete way ahead to ensure interagency cooperation. Due to the nature of the guide, it can only be a recommended way ahead, which may or may not be used by the individuals it applies to. This makes it difficult to solidify gains made by the planning team.

Our current environment provides examples where interagency partnerships are successful; however, there has been little success in creating a concrete interagency

partnership plan. While it appears that we are now fairly successful when it comes to partnering, these lessons are learned again in the present, instead of learning from the same efforts made in the past. These historic lessons must be heeded as we get ready to enter semi-post conflict so that we do not disregard them again. Nathan Finney points out this danger in his article on “Modern American Foreign Policy”, “Observers and commentators on modern American foreign policy have consistently identified that collaboration between the elements of national power appear to be punctuated by years of uncoordinated programs and internecine fighting.”³⁵ We must open our eyes to the value of the past in partnering.

The United States became a global leader, both militarily and economically, in the years following World War II, however, our international partnering and/or pacification efforts started before that time and have continued into the present. Historical examples include the Philippine American War, US Intervention in Cuba, the Marshall Plan, the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program in Vietnam³⁶, and humanitarian efforts in Somalia. The National Training Missions in both Iraq³⁷ and Afghanistan³⁸ are included as well, although not strictly historical, there is a pattern emerging that puts these operations on the cusp of being partnership areas of knowledge lost by inattention to their value. There are countless additional examples worldwide, however, the goal is not to provide a history of partnering, but to illuminate how we do not learn the lessons of history.

The Philippine American War (1899-1902) offered lessons in partnering to the benefit of the local population. Granted, this was in a campaign to colonize the

Philippines, but it provides a lesson in how we have lost capabilities of pacification that are part of the needed skills for partnership. Most of the current historical documentation of the Philippine American War speaks of the US Army brutalizing the population when in fact the Army started the “policy of attraction,’ the term used to describe such army activities as the establishment of schools, municipal governments, and public works projects. The leaders of the revolution feared that the Americans would succeed in winning Filipino acceptance of American rule through such an enlightened policy”³⁹ in accordance with John Gates in his book *The U.S. Army and Irregular Warfare*.

Close on the heels of the Philippine American War, U.S. intervention in Cuba in 1906 was the first conflict where a U.S. military occupation was used to stabilize the new government. Paul Miller noted in his article “Five Pillars of American Grand Strategy” that

The United States more or less invented this form of intervention when it occupied Cuba following the Spanish–American War to facilitate Cuban independence from Spain. Instead of annexing the island, as it did other territories seized in the war, the United States rebuilt infrastructure, set up a new government, oversaw four elections, and then left.⁴⁰

The Marshall Plan called for American assistance on a global scale in restoring the economic infrastructure of Europe⁴¹. Marshall was convinced that the “key to restoration of political stability lay in the revitalization of national economies. Further he saw political stability in Western Europe as a key to blunting the advances of communism in that region.”⁴² The plan was a universal success and the combined

efforts of multiple government agencies under the auspices of one charismatic leader is an area worth studying even today for examples of successful unity of effort.⁴³

In Vietnam the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program was successful. J.R. Bullington, a Foreign Area Officer who served in Vietnam during the implementation of the program said that “the previously disjointed U.S. structure for implementing pacification was unified into a much more effective civil-military organization called CORDS”.⁴⁴ Mr. Bullington believes that the unity of effort during the CORDS process broke the counterinsurgency in Vietnam. Studying this program would certainly aid in understanding how unity of effort in a combat zone can provide strategic benefits in a “hearts and minds” campaign.

The Somalia situation is a historic example of what happens when a humanitarian crisis leads to conflict. This example also shows that there does not need to be a war to require troops to aid in the partnership process. When failing states and destabilized regions are where the diplomatic and developmental efforts are occurring, defense needs to be part of the planning to ensure security for the whole process.

Iraq and Afghanistan are the most recent examples for what works and doesn't work in the interagency effort. NATO Training Missions Iraq (NTM-I) and Afghanistan (NTM-A) planned and carried out interagency and international efforts at Nation Building. These costly efforts applied the same standards to both countries. This was a mistake as there was no identification of the needs of a literate modern country vice the needs of an illiterate poor agrarian society. This was an inevitable occurrence due not to lack of oversight, but to lack of time. The DoD was the lead agency and had to create

transition plans at the same time they were fighting the war. DoS and USAID were involved but did not have the resources nor the plans available to identify in advance the requirements for Nation Building. Eric James, in 2003, noted in the Journal for Humanitarian Assistance that “what is clear from the recent Coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq is that a deeper, more results-oriented examination and follow through is needed”.⁴⁵ 11 years after the beginning of the conflicts, we have lessons learned but there is still no organization to coordinate the collection and analysis of that information.

Countless tomes on the histories of different conflicts have been written, yet rarely is there a paragraph on skills for partnering both nationally and internationally. We learn how to interact over and over, only to lose momentum in peacetime and post-conflict environments when the United States begins leaning toward its isolationist past. Focus must be placed not only on learning the right lessons from history, but also how to modify those lessons for a different culture or geopolitical location.

So what is the solution to a lack of interagency partnership? First, we have to acknowledge that we cannot continue to lose the lessons of history. More importantly we cannot afford to lose the lessons of the last 11 years as we move forward. Paul Miller identified that we are heading toward losing the skills of partnership before they can be institutionalized

The reversal of two decades’ worth of investment and grinding experience in stability operations is an unfortunate risk that ignores the realities of the contemporary security environment. Weak and failing states, and the rogue actors who operate within them, represent a real threat to regional – and even global – stability. Cutting back on stability operations now will mean throwing

away hard-fought gains, and expose the United States to new risks from across the globalising, fragile world.⁴⁶

Mr. Miller is not alone in this belief. Quy H. Nguyen in his Simons Center article states that the Nation's leaders must ensure lasting interagency cooperation and "...unity of effort. Failing in this, the hard lessons learned from the sacrifices of DoD personnel and personnel of other U.S government agencies will atrophy and have to be learned again at a terrible cost."⁴⁷

A continuing problem with regard to creating unity of effort is many of the ideas are not staffed. No matter how many good efforts are developed and worked at the agency level, at the National Level planning and ideas for coordination can exist without substance. Even the President issued orders that are reiterated in the QDDR, for the "creation of a robust and integrated national security professional development program, comprised of education, training, and professional experiences to heighten collaboration and a mutual understanding among cadre members of the authorities, mission requirements, capabilities, and operations of the government,"⁴⁸ yet the National Security Professional program still has no clearly defined authority. The 3D planning team is yet another example of a program without teeth. Members at the Cabinet and National Security Council level may all agree to coordinate, yet the salient ideas do not get beyond that level. Without tasking an organization to take the initiative agencies wonder why their plans go nowhere.

One of the reasons for a lack of staffing is resourcing. "No buck, no buck rogers" is true of any government attempt at creating solutions. Not only do DoD,

DoS, and USAID have differing missions, their resourcing is also different. The QDDR showed that in 2010, DoS and USAID combined, received approximately the equivalent 10% of the DoD budget.⁴⁹ This did not change much in 2013 when the DoD budget request was \$525.4 billion compared to the \$51.6 billion requested by DoS and USAID.⁵⁰ While the requirements of the departments are not comparable, certainly a balancing change should occur as the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan become increasingly led by civilian agencies. Furthermore, the approach to garner congressional support must be refocused, and together DOS and USAID must improve the case for the mission and the cost of maintaining a standing civilian response capability.⁵¹

In addition to agency partnership efforts and national level conceptualization, there is no dearth of ideas to resolve the disconnect between the agencies. Buchanan, Davis and Wight in the *Joint Forces Quarterly* observed that “Spurred by recent experience, gaining unity of effort within the interagency realm has galvanized so much debate that possible solutions are blooming from almost every think tank and military academic institution.”⁵² Their particular solution is to replace the GCCs with Joint Interagency Commands (JIACOMs). The idea is to create a civilian led multiagency command that has full authority across the elements of national power (DIME).⁵³ Even the authors sound skeptical of this concept reaching fruition.

The Joint Interagency concept is too big and it would remove the interagency checks and balances needed to refresh dialogue. When the solution removes the

interagency and merges it into one, there is the risk of having the military and diplomatic parts of DIME agreeing due to proximity if nothing else.

Mr. Dawn Watts makes a similar recommendation in his paper “How We Can Win the Long War: A New Interagency Approach to the GWOT”. He believes that “the DOD should be tasked to be the regional synchronizer by converting the current regional GCCs into Geographic Interagency Commands (GIC) that incorporate all the interagency players in a regional organization with one boss and one coordinated mission.”⁵⁴ This too is a huge change that requires decisions made at the national strategic level without any guarantee of improving the interagency process.

There are other examples, but the common theme is that each solution seems bigger than the last with many requiring yet another layer of bureaucracy or a concept that is an idea without any source of testing the solution before we expend resources and effort. It is necessary to take a step back, identify interagency success and build upon it, not destroy what has been accomplished and have a new solution emerge like a phoenix from the ashes. The Interagency needs to follow the “just do it” mantra of Nike instead of the “lets talk about it” approach on which we currently spend too much time.

The United States needs a fusion of successful efforts within the interagency and a way to coordinate them with minimal additional resourcing. If these efforts can be leveraged with buy in from all, then disruption is minimized and a successful coordination center is provided that can leverage capabilities by coordinating partnering efforts. The solution lies in an Office of International Partnering (OIP).

Global partnership allows for the strengthening of ties between the United States and other nations and developing an OIP will enable the creation of a strategy that encompasses DoD, DoS and USAID. Creating and implementing a United States International Partnering strategy through OIP will not only address the main interests of the United States on a country by country basis, but will also help us to align our interests with other nations through the 3D process, giving all members of the interagency one-stop shopping for developing plans and strategies.

The OIP will create a common language of partnering while applying the best historically successful efforts to the current operating environment.

The conceptual idea for OIP is to have an organization that provides coordination capabilities and reach back to all members of the interagency. There is currently no clearinghouse of information and lessons learned for agency personnel to utilize prior to entering a country or region, nor is there a cadre of individuals who know how to analyze and apply that information. While DoS and USAID personnel receive training for their particular missions, many of their military partners, with the exception of trained Foreign Area Officers, receive minimal training at best. This is not conducive to interagency understanding of the international cultural environment.

OIP will co-opt the current JIACGs by having administrative control, while the GCC will retain operational control. This will provide teams developed to reside in each GCC to interact with the embassies of the region and ensure unity of effort. While similar to the Integrated Country Strategy concept developed by the DoS, divergence will be in training and education, as well as the JIACGs independent operating capability

tied back to the main OIP. Additionally, military individuals who work within the teams will receive a secondary Military Occupational Specialty.

Access to the Integrated Country Strategies will be given to OIP to assist in research and training for personnel to aid Country Missions and GCCs in accomplishing their interagency responsibilities. Additionally, individuals dealing with large scale missions such as NTM-I and NTM-A would have a repository for records and documents that have no means of safeguard in a combat environment.

Initially OIP will reside within the DoD as this is the optimal way to achieve the desired end state, since DoD is more heavily resourced and has a robust planning and organizational development capability. DoD may not be the final location of OIP but that will be determined during implementation.

DoD sponsorship through DSCA would leverage the current interactions in both the diplomatic and developmental pillars of 3D as well as the current defense process. This will enable the OIP implementation team to use existing lines of communication within the interagency. Of course, knowledge of diplomacy and development is not the same as having a capability, so it is imperative that OIP be a joint interagency office that is inclusive of DoS and USAID as joint partners in the effort. The goal is not for the military to get into the business of diplomacy, or DoS to get into the business of security. There must be a middle ground that takes into account the strengths and weaknesses of each organization, much in the same way that each branch of the military brings their own expertise to the table in the Joint Strategic environment.

Having the DoD shouldering the resourcing aspect of planning and implementation would make DSCA sponsorship a more acceptable prospect to the other agencies, provided they received an equitable balance in decision making. Initial sponsorship by DSCA would require a modification that allowed for interagency cooperation, with individuals assigned to the office on a rotational basis. The command structure would be dual hatted with the Commander and Deputy Commander positions rotating between DoD and DoS.

The OIP strategy combines DoD resources with interagency knowledge which enables all assets to be used efficiently while reducing redundancy. The main risks associated with the OIP strategy are having the 3D's reside under DSCA even temporarily. This could give the appearance that all partnering efforts are military actions. Additionally, this option may appear to create an interagency group that usurps the tasks of the embassy and the diplomatic corps. These risks can be mitigated by identifying which agency has the lead in each effort and how they present themselves.

OIP will leverage technology and training to provide the best information and personnel for interagency efforts. Emphasis on personal interaction is imperative, as dialogue is the glue that will make this effort successful. The goal is not to create something totally different, but to take small steps toward using the skills and successes that already exist in a new way. NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ) and Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) are two successful commands from which to model OIP. They demonstrate successful cross agency dual command structure and international dual command structure. These units are examples of how to achieve

buy- in without a heavy initial cost outlay. Both began as small organizations with symbiotic relationships within existing command structures.

The OIP will use a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) type of organization during implementation. A MOU organization will be most suitable as it is “a contract used to set forth the basic principles and guidelines under which the parties will work together to accomplish their goals”.⁵⁵ An MOU will include the funding and personnel agreed upon by the agencies. This is ideal for an implementation team as its inherent flexibility will allow for further development of resourcing, force structure, and strategic planning. Follow on, if vetted successfully through Initial operational capability (IOC) to Full operational capability (FOC), will potentially be an independent agency funded and manned through DoD, DoS and USAID, with DoD continuing as the framework agency.

Beginning on a small scale, with approximately 20-25 individuals in the implementation team, the OIP will be able to develop capabilities quickly. The Commander of DSCA will initially be the Commander of OIP and will be dual hatted. The Deputy Commander will be an ES-3 or ES-4 Senior Foreign Service Officer (SFSO) under the Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources. The SFSO will reside under the Deputy Secretary of State as a direct report, as other areas of DoS are too specialized for the purpose of OIP. Both command individuals will be designated, in writing, by the Secretaries of Defense and State respectively and will have a Chief of Staff from their organization to run implementation.

Similar in construct to the implementation team of the NATO Special Operations Coordination Centre (NSCC), OIP would use the initial 20-25 personnel to craft how the

office will best meet the needs of the interagency. These personnel will be taken out of the existing structure of DoD, DoS and USAID. The combination of agencies negates the idea of developing a structure that is inherently DoD, DoS or USAID (e.g. a J1 through J8), but would require individuals who could “multi-agency” across requirements. The organization would develop through IOC to a final personnel capacity of no more than 150 at FOC. Ideally, the OIP would stay flexible at this size and avoid adding another layer of bureaucracy to already top-heavy government agencies.

Funding during this time of fiscal constraints will be difficult; however with such a small implementation team, costs would be minimal and focused on travel, initial outfitting and finding a home for the OIP. Ideally, funding will come through DSCA but be managed at the OIP and require an initial outlay of no more than \$500,000 in the first fiscal year of implementation.⁵⁶ This amount is approximately 25% of the DSCA budget so it cannot be taken out of existing resources, but rather will be funded by DoD via Other Contingency Operation (OCO) request until the OIP can be established under program of record requirements.

The organization will be physically located in DSCA until another facility within the Washington DC area can be identified by the implementation team. There are many locations that would be suitable and available to meet the needs of the small footprint of OIP.

Development of a training and education program will be conceptual during implementation. The effort will center on identifying current available training and

education programs and how they can be used by the unit. It is doubtful that given the current training and education opportunities that an organically developed unit training center would be necessary.

The above described concept of development for the OIP is not a pre-determined solution, but a way ahead that takes into consideration the constraints of the current fiscal environment balanced against the needs for unity of effort. As we enter the post conflict environment, the United States cannot afford to lose the skills in partnering that have been attained over the last 11 years.

In conclusion, the National Security Strategy of 2008 stated that, "We as a nation must strengthen not only our military capabilities, but also reinvigorate other important elements of national power and develop the capability to integrate, tailor, and apply these tools as needed."⁵⁷ The OIP will do this without creating dramatic and overarching bureaucratic change that is too inherently risky for the current global environment. By providing a template for a small organization that can grow and develop as information is analyzed, risks can be mitigated as they occur.

Partner activities can and will have a significant impact on national security, and the application of soft power through partnering can assist in furthering the interests of the United States as a whole. Getting to the cultural roots of a country or region will bring a better understanding of their diplomatic, developmental and defense interests so that the United States can leverage that knowledge to coincide with our own interests.

The OIP will meet peace-time and post-war partnership coordination needs and enable the U.S. Government to develop concise strategic information tailored to each

region, country and culture based on diplomacy, development and defense. The development of a common language of partnering will combine the best historically successful efforts with a view to what the future of globalization holds.

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